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I. INTRODUCTION
$2,150,000,000. That was the price that the Guggenheim
Partners—a Los Angeles-based team of investors whose public face
is local icon Magic Johnson—paid to purchase the Los Angeles
Dodgers baseball team.1 In the prolonged bidding period that
preceded this decision—a game of financial tug of war between titans
bidding for control of one of the most prolific professional sports
teams in U.S. history—no other potential owner’s bid was within
$600 million of the Guggenheim bid.2 Not only did the new owners
of the historic franchise outspend their opponents by an obscene
amount, they outspent history.
The previous record of the highest price paid during the sale of a
professional baseball franchise was the $845 million paid to purchase
the Chicago Cubs several years earlier.3 The Dodgers more than
doubled that price. Before the sale, the Dodgers themselves were
coming off one of the most disappointing stretches in their long,
mostly successful, history: subpar play on the field4 (decades since a
1

Dodgers Sold to Magic Johnson Group, ESPN LA (Mar. 28, 2012, 1:21 PM),
http://espn.go.com/los-angeles/mlb/story/_/id/7745566/los-angeles-dodgersselling-team-magic-johnson-group-2b.
2
Darren Rovell, Made For TV: If Their New Deal Hits Big, the Dodgers May
Have Been a Bargain After All. Your Team Should Be So Lucky, ESPN THE
MAGAZINE, Nov. 12, 2012, at 34-37.
3
ESPN, supra note 1.
4
The Dodgers last World Series title came over twenty years ago, in 1988,
delivered on the bat—and hobbled leg—of slugger Kirk Gibson and his iconic
home run. On This Day: Kirk Gibson Hit His World Series Homer, USA TODAY
(Oct.
15,
2012,
3:07
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/gameon/2012/10/15/kirk-gibson-bryan-cranstondennis-eckersley-vin-scully-world-series-home-run/1633933.
Since then, it has hardly been the glory days for the Dodgers. They have
traded superstars away, like Hall of Famer Pedro Martinez, just before their prime,
at the same time trading for players who have ultimately underperformed or—like
Manny Ramirez—shined brightly before disgracing the team with a lengthy steroid
suspension. See Ross Newhan, A Long-term Trade Deficit: L.A. Dodgers’ Worst
Trade Ever? For Many Fans, and One Hall of Fame Baseball Writer, the Choice
is Clear: Pedro Martinez for Delino DeShields in 1993, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 22,
2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/apr/22/sports/sp-pedrodelino22; see also
Tom Verducci, Ramirez Tests Positive, Suspended 50 Games by MLB, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED
(May
11,
2009,
12:18
PM),
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/baseball/mlb/05/07/manny/index.html.
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last World Series appearance),5 lagging attendance,6 dubious
financial practices, abhorrent team oversight conducted by their lessthan-admired owner,7 and, most tragically, a fan’s brutal beating after
a game in the team’s expansive parking area.8 Even ignoring these
As if to rub pine tar in the Dodgers’ wounds, the universe has rewarded the
Dodgers’ bitterest rivals, the San Francisco Giants, with two World Series
Championships in the last three years. See Andrew Keh, With a Sweep, Giants are
Champions
Again,
NY
TIMES
(Oct.
29,
2012),
www.nytimes.com/2012/10/29/sports/baseball/giants-sweep-tigers-to-win-secondworld-series-title-in-three-years.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. The Giants’ first title
came when Los Angeles was at a nadir, but perhaps the second, and most recent,
title hurt more. In 2012, just after the Dodgers acquired their top-dollar stars, the
Giants went on an improbable title run and left the Dodgers in the proverbial rosin
dust. Bill Plaschke, The Giants Leave the Dodgers in Their Wake, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 25, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/25/sports/la-sp-plaschkegiants-20121026.
6
Attendance in 2011 was down almost two million fans from just two seasons
earlier.
BASEBALL
ALMANAC,
http://www.baseballalmanac.com/teams/laatte.shtml (last visited Feb. 3, 2013).
7
Less-than-admired would be perhaps the most magnanimous way of
describing Frank McCourt, who was described in 2011—in bold type—as “the
most hated man in the history of Los Angeles” by the Los Angeles Times sports
blog. See Steve Dilbeck, Frank McCourt: the Most Despised Man in the History of
Los
Angeles,
L.A.
TIMES
(June
27,
2011,
3:51
PM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/dodgers/2011/06/frank-mccourt-the-most-despisedman-in-the-history-of-los-angeles.html.
McCourt fought his ouster, most notably towards the end by trying to cling to
some of the team’s enormous parking revenues. Ramona Shelbourne, McCourt
Gets No Parking Money, ESPN LA (Mar. 29, 2012, 10:08 PM),
http://espn.go.com/los-angeles/mlb/story/_/id/7752934/frank-mccourt-receives-noparking-revenue-los-angeles-dodgers-sources-say.
8
Bill Shaikin, Frank McCourt Agrees to Sell Dodgers, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 1,
2011, 9:45 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/dodgers/2011/11/mccourt-agreesto-sell-dodgers.html.
San Francisco Giants fan Bryan Stow was severely beaten by several men in
one of the parking lots adjacent to Dodgers Stadium after a game. Bryan Stow: the
Dodger Stadium Beating One Year Later, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2012, 9:38 AM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/03/bryan-stow-a-year-after-dodgersbeating-remarkable-progress.html.
The beating of Bryan Stow should not be lightly discussed. It is perhaps
callous to list it here with these other of the Los Angeles Dodgers’ recent foibles.
Stow was beaten by several men outside of Dodger Stadium, while shocked
baseball fans on their way to their cars looked on. Without trivializing the human
aspect of the Bryan Stow tragedy, the entire event did become a talking point for
both fans of the Dodgers and Dodgers haters in the following seasons. Fan anger
5
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ignominious warts that any visitor to the old ballpark at Chavez
Ravine could not help but notice, one could be forgiven for failing to
see how the $2.15 billion price tag made any sense at all. Stripped of
the Dodgers’ mystique, the glitz of L.A., and the rest, this was still
just a baseball team. Ninety feet from home plate to first base. Same
clay on the infield as any other. Same beer in the same plastic cups
in the stands. What made this deal any different than the hundreds
that came before it? One word: television.
At the time of the historic sale, the Dodgers found themselves at a
broadcasting crossroads. The decision facing every professional
sports team in North America these days is whether, when their
current television deal runs its course, they should attempt to
capitalize on fan interest and establish their own network, soaking in
all of the benefits and room for growth that such a maneuver would
entail. Or, whether a market for that team’s broadcast rights exists
such that the team should “cash in” and sign off on the biggest
contract that it can manage.9 Either way, television in sports—and
the money that television in sports represents—has never, ever been
bigger.10 After the purchase of the Dodgers by Magic Johnson and
company, the team acquired hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of
on-field talent, and has completely committed to wringing as much as

about the lack of security in the parking lots and about the general tenor around the
stadium had been bubbling over before the incident, and the fact that McCourt
made a literal fortune from the very fans who were afraid to park there did nothing
to assuage the outrage.
9
See Joe Forward, Sports and the Law: A National Niche and a Baseball Deal
to Remember, 85 WIS. LAW. 6, 11 (2012) (“Teams such as the New York Yankees
and the Boston Red Sox have started their own networks, retaining the
broadcasting rights while reaping the big revenue rewards. In turn, these teams can
sign the big money players. After 2013, the new Dodgers owner could do the
same, or let broadcasters compete for broadcasting rights”).
10
See Natalie L. St. Cyr Clarke, The Beauty and the Beast: Taming the Ugly
Side of the People’s Game, 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 601, 624 (2011). Although the
League arranges national broadcasting contracts, the bulk of broadcasting revenue
traditionally comes from the local contracts that individual teams enter into. Id.
Increasingly, however, teams are setting up their own networks. In New York, both
MLB teams have stakes in their own network; the Yankees’ YES Network
generated $400m in revenue in 2010. Id. This contributed to the Bronx Bombers,
at $427m, having revenue of about $155m higher than the team with the next
highest revenue team, Boston Red Sox. Id.
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they can out of a subsequent television deal.11 It sure seems like it
was all worth it. The Dodgers recently announced that they have
come to terms on a deal with Time Warner Cable, worth an estimated
eight billion dollars over the next twenty-five years.12 As part of the
deal,13 there will be a “team-owned” channel, called “SportsNet LA,”
debuting in 2014.14
11

Rovell, supra note 2, at 35–37.
The Dodgers’ 2012 season was, from most perspectives, a disappointment.
Although the team exhibited improved performance on the field, and saw
attendance—and “buzz”—boost throughout the season, they failed to make the
playoffs. See Tim Brown, Dodgers’ Desperate Playoff Chase Ends With Another
Stumble,
YAHOO!
SPORTS
(Oct.
3,
2012,
3:47
AM),
http://sports.yahoo.com/news/dodgers--desperate-playoff-chase-ends-withstumble.html. Most would see the future as “bright,” for the team even still. Late
in the season, the Dodgers acquired Mexican-born slugger (and Southern California
favorite) Adrian Gonzalez, pitcher Josh Beckett, and outfielder Carl Crawford from
the Boston Red Sox in what can be called, without hyperbole, one of the largest
trades in baseball history. See Jayson Stark, A Blockbuster Unlike Any Other: Red
Sox, Dodgers Pull Off a History-Making, Franchise-Changing Trade, in August,
ESPN
MLB
(Aug.
25,
2012,
7:03
PM),
http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/8302371/red-sox-dodgers-deal-history-maker.
This trend continued into the offseason wherein the Dodgers won the bidding
rights for a South Korean pitcher, paying $25.7 million simply for the rights to
negotiate with Ryu Hyun-jin. Dylan Hernandez, Ryu Hyun-jin Signs With
Dodgers,
L.A.
TIMES
(Dec.
9,
2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/09/sports/la-sp-dn-ryu-signs-20121209.
While the big trade did not lead to improvements on the field, the message was
clear—the new ownership group is “all in.” They expect to spend big, win big,
and, almost exclusively through funds obtained in the new television deal, earn big.
See Scott Boeck, Magic Johnson: World Series or Bust, USA TODAY (Feb. 4,
2013, 1:15 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/gameon/2013/02/04/magicjohnson-dodgers-world-series/1890413 (quoting Magic Johnson as having stated,
“[w]e want to go to the World Series. If we don’t accomplish that, yes, it’s not a
good season for us”).
12
Bill Shaikin, Dodgers Officially Announce Deal with Time Warner Cable,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/28/sports/la-spdodgers-tv-20130129.
13
The deal is still pending, waiting for the approval of Major League Baseball.
As of March 10, 2013, Major League Baseball had not yet reviewed the terms of
the agreement. Mike Ozanian, Dodgers TV Deal with Time Warner Cable Still Not
Seen
by
MLB,
FORBES
(Feb.
9,
2013,
7:48
AM),
www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2013/02/09/dodgers-tv-deal-with-time-warnercable-still-seen-by-mlb.
14
Id.

Spring 2013

The Individual Regional Sports Network

307

Before this deal was reached, prognostication about the possible
terms and effects of the deal could hardly be avoided. One
sportswriter predicted that when the Dodgers sold the rights to
broadcast their games in the coming seasons, they would have been
able to negotiate a deal for up to $225 million per year.15 Shortly
after the conclusion of the 2012 Major League Baseball (MLB)
season, one sportswriter opined that rather than gargantuan, the
prospective Dodgers’ television deal should really be termed
“dangerous.”16 Most predict that the Dodgers’ move to Time Warner
Cable and an exclusive—read, not free—cable home for all of their
games will lead to consternation among Dodger fans, but at least a
few sportswriters have predicted that it’s nothing more than the wave
of the future.17
The financial windfall from selling television rights to a preexisting Regional Sports Network (RSN), a type of network that
obtains the rights to broadcast sports teams’ games in a certain
market, such as Fox Sports or Comcast, is only one option available
to teams when they reach this crossroads. Perhaps the even more
lucrative option—certainly the option with the higher financial
“ceiling” for runaway success—was for the Dodgers to take
“control” of their own network.18 That’s just what they have decided
to do, but with a few tweaks to the system along the way.
15

Rovell, supra note 2, at 35–37.
See Jeff Passan, Dodgers’ $6B-$7B TV Deal Will Widen Chasm Between
MLB’s Rich and Poor, YAHOO! SPORTS (Nov. 25, 2012, 11:08 PM),
http://sports.yahoo.com/news/dodgers---7-billion-tv-deal-will-widen-chasmbetween-mlb-s-rich-and-poor-040842261.html.
Yahoo!’s Jeff Passan sums up the fears of a certain contingent of televisionmoney wary fans aptly, writing that the Dodgers’ potential T.V. money haul really
symbolizes the “the siren that baseball's new era has arrived, one in which the
sport's best revenue-sharing intentions cannot save it from the self-cannibalizing
greed that drives these TV mega-contracts—and drives a wedge between the haves
and have-nots harder to extract than sword from stone.” Id. Passan goes on
highlight the fact that—if the predicted television revenues prove accurate—the
Dodgers will be taking in more television money than most teams earn in entire
revenue. Id.
17
Josh Luger, How the $7 Billion Dodgers TV Deal Could Actually be Good
for Consumers, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 7, 2013, 3:30 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-7-billion-dodgers-tv-deal-could-actuallybe-good-for-consumers-2013-2.
18
Id.
16
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Not all of the moving parts of the Dodgers’ deal with Time
Warner have been announced just yet, but it appears that the Dodgers
will be the proud proprietors of a “team-owned” network.19 Here is
why that detail is critically important for Magic and his colleagues:
Major League Baseball generally collects about one-third of
broadcast revenue that any given team generates, and these revenues
are then included in baseball’s “revenue sharing” mechanism, which
attempts to level the playing field between rich and poor in the major
leagues by redistributing the wealth.20 But, and this is the critical
distinction, when a team assumes the risk of owning its own
television network—if the money is merely “potential” instead of
guaranteed, depending on how the team manages its broadcasting, its
finances, and the network as a whole—that team is generally allowed
to keep almost all of the network’s profits.21 It would be as if
lawyers who “hang their own shingle” did not have to pay back any
of their law school debt. When you’re expecting to make as much
money as the Dodgers are over the next twenty-five years, this
potential savings makes an unmistakably colossal difference.22
19

Shaikin, supra note 12.
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. But this also represents one of the major reasons this deal has not yet
been announced. Bill Shaikin, one of the foremost Dodgers sportswriters and a
blogger for the L.A. Times, discussed the following issues in his piece on the deal
with Time Warner Cable:
20

At least two elements of the new television contract probably
will draw particular scrutiny from MLB, according to people
familiar with the deal but not authorized to discuss it. Time
Warner Cable has guaranteed the Dodgers fees from cable and
satellite providers even if those companies do not carry the new
channel, the people said. Also, TWC has guaranteed the Dodgers
certain fees as part of what the team might present as an
expansion of TWC's current sponsorship. If MLB contends the
Dodgers are taking no significant financial risk in those or other
elements of the contract, the league could assess the 34% fee on
the relevant revenue. The Dodgers are prepared to appeal any
such assessments to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, which has final
say as part of the settlement between McCourt and MLB.
Id. (emphasis added). Whether or not the Dodgers are truly taking on enough of the
“risk” inherent in owning their own network is a unique question. It is also one of
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Even with only the early details of this massive deal having been
reported, it appears that, by deciding to build their own “dedicated
network,” the Dodgers have become the newest members of a
small—but growing—broadcast club. They are now essentially the
owners of what is known as an Individual Regional Sports Network
(IRSN).23 These networks, popularized in recent years by the success
of the Yankees Entertainment and Sports Network (YES), the Red
Sox’s New England Sports Network (NESN), and the University of
Texas’s Longhorn Network, among several other channels, may be
the wave of the future in sports broadcasting. As with any venture,
there are drawbacks to taking a sports team network “out on its
own.”24 But one by one, teams are realizing that the potential
benefits outweigh these risks.25 This article will analyze the potential
the many ways in which this Dodgers T.V. deal might blaze new ground for future
broadcast issues in sport. Either way, all eyes are on the boys in blue.
23
It was hypothesized that the Dodgers may have been wrangling for some
sort of control with a larger Regional Sports Network, like Fox or Time Warner,
which would allow them to achieve a “best of both worlds” type of scenario. See
Bill Shaikin, Fox or Time Warner? Dodgers Said to be “50/50” Over TV Choice,
L.A.
TIMES
(Jan.
4,
2013,
5:45
PM),
http://www.latimes.com/sports/dodgersnow/la-sp-dn-fox-time-warner-dodgers-tv20130104,0,2302915.story.
24
Presumably, these are the “risks” that Major League Baseball takes into
account when determining that a team that owns its network does not have to pitch
in as much to league revenue sharing. See Jack Humphreville, Would You Pay
$120 to Watch the Dodgers on TV?, CITYWATCH (May 31, 2013),
http://www.citywatchla.com/lead-stories-hidden/5168-would-you-pay-120-towatch-the-dodgers-on-tv.
25
RSNs and independently owned RSNs carry various benefits and risks. The
most clearly recognizable risk is simply that independent ownership leaves one
more exposed to the potential costs of failure, whereas attaching a television deal to
a larger “host” network, like Fox, Comcast, and the rest, helps to allocate some of
these burdens.
It is believed that the Dodgers negotiated with Fox Sports for some time before
beginning to entertain offers from Time Warner Cable. The major holdup appeared
to be the fact that the Dodgers wanted to be considered an IRSN, even if this were
to occur as part of a larger deal with combined ownership with an established
company like Time Warner, which might allow them to pay substantially less to
MLB, as discussed above, than if they signed a more-standard contract with an
RSN. See Shaikin, supra note 23. According to Bill Shaikin:
The Dodgers' discussions with MLB center on whether all of
their guaranteed television revenue should be subject to baseball's
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for expansion of IRSNs throughout baseball and sports in general,
and, more importantly, what freedom baseball’s regulatory authority
might have to reign in this wild expansion in the “best interests of the
game” and to maintain some semblance of parity in the sport moving
forward.
All of this is well and good for the business pages, but what about
the game that takes place on the field? With the Dodgers ready to
join the Yankees as the league’s biggest spenders, will there be
anything left for the small market teams, and their fans, to play for?
It has become apparent to baseball fans, and sports fans in
general, that it must be asked whether the leagues themselves can do
anything to restrict, or at least to further regulate, this potential
expansion. As the way that Americans watch sports changes more
rapidly than ever, it is getting harder and harder to regulate financial
growth and its effect on competitive balance. Could MLB stop the
Dodgers26 from joining baseball’s other elite teams as partial or
whole RSN owners, thus arming them with a greater opportunity to
use broadcast wealth as a way to expand the revenue gap in the
sport?27 Could MLB reassess the formula currently used to
revenue-sharing program. At issue in a $6-billion deal: whether
the team's contribution to the program would be about $1 billion
or about $2 billion. The league believes—and there are
indications the court might agree—that the Dodgers must take
some element of risk with any money not subject to revenue
sharing. The Dodgers must contribute 34% of the annual rights
fee to baseball's revenue-sharing program. The team plans to
launch its own regional sports network, in part to avoid the
prospect of Fox or TWC paying a much higher rights fee.
However, in order to get dividends from a regional sports
network, the league believes the team should be required to take
the accompanying risk of ownership. The Dodgers are looking at
other ways to structure a deal that would shield that money from
revenue sharing and satisfy MLB as well.
Id.
26

They have not, and they will not. Perhaps the question needs to be asked
now, if only to better prepare the method of analysis for the next big market team
that attempts to cash in with a massive television deal.
27
See
2012
MLB
Salaries
by
Team,
USA
TODAY,
http://content.usatoday.com/sportsdata/baseball/mlb/salaries/team (last visited
Feb. 3, 2013), for a list of Major League Baseball salaries by team and player.
Baseball has had a long and well-documented, frustrating history with revenue
and competitive balances. While the NHL, the NFL, and the NBA all boast salary
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determine how much of its broadcast revenues a team has to give
back through revenue sharing? It is more likely than not that these
issues will need to be addressed in the coming years.
The effects of the Dodgers’ deal will be felt soon enough. In ten
years, when more teams are reaching for the golden chest, it will be
important for baseball, and the baseball adoring public, to be aware
of what control they might be able to exercise—or to ask a regulatory
authority to exercise—in order to preserve the competitive balance of
the sport that they love.
II. THE BUSINESS OF REGIONAL SPORTS NETWORKS
Individual Regional Sports Networks like the YES Network and
the Longhorn Network are offshoots of a broader base of network,
the Regional Sports Network itself. RSNs are the primary way that
most Americans watch sports in the modern era, but that has not
always been the case. Any discussion of the history of sports
broadcast issues needs to begin with the Sports Broadcasting Act of

caps of some kind to ensure parity, Major League Baseball has resisted such a
move. William B. Gould IV, Labor Issues in Professional Sports: Reflections on
Baseball, Labor, and Antitrust Law, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV 61, 93 (2004)
(discussing how the “luxury tax” in MLB is not a “hard cap,” as in other sports).
That is to say, the MLB Players Association (“MLBPA”) has resisted such a move.
The MLBPA is arguably the toughest and most successful of the professional
players unions. Darren A. Heitner & Jason B. Wolf, In Baseball’s Best Interest?: A
Discussion of the October 2010 MLBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents, 10
VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 249, 250 (2011) (“In 1997, it was said that ‘the strongest
union to date’ is the Major League Baseball Player’s Association . . . currently in
effect. Fourteen years later, that statement would be hard to refute.”).
In the last twenty years, players’ salaries have skyrocketed and teams have
gone along for the ride, with salaries shooting up to as much as $150 to $200
million dollars for the top teams, while small market teams are left fighting to build
a team with less than half—and sometimes about a quarter—of that amount. See
David Haddock, Tonja Jacobi, & Matthew Sag, League Structure & Stadium RentSeeking: The Role of Antitrust Revisited, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2013) (stating that
the average MLB salary in 2012 was over $3 million).
The average salary of a New York Yankees player is over $6 million per year.
See 2012 MLB Salaries by Team, USA TODAY, supra note 27. The average salary
of an Oakland Athletics player is $2 million per year. Id. While both teams made
the playoffs in 2012, you can bet the farm that the Yankees will be there with more
consistency over the next decade, much as they were in the last. See Standings,
MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/standings (last visited Feb. 3, 2013).
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1961.28 The Sports Broadcasting Act (SBA) was Congress’s reaction
to a now-infamous case pertaining to the broadcasting of National
Football League (NFL)29 games.30
In the early days of sports broadcasting, teams were able to
manage their own rights because these rights had been generally
considered to belong to the teams themselves, rather than the
league.31 This original suit between the U.S. and the NFL,
commonly known as “NFL 1,” dealt with the pooling of NFL
broadcasting rights, and specifically with whether it was an
unreasonable restraint on trade for the NFL to enforce Article X of its
bylaws, which prevented outside-market games from being broadcast
into another team’s local market when that team was “on the road.”32
28

Exemption From Antitrust Laws of Agreements Covering the Telecasting of
Sports Contests and the Combining of Professional Football Leagues, 15 U.S.C. §
1291 (2011).
29
The NFL has been a hotbed of antitrust issues, specifically relating to
broadcasts, both on radio and television, of team’s content. While baseball and
MLB perhaps hold the most interesting hand when it comes to antitrust immunity,
the NFL’s history is almost as rich. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm’n
v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussing how,
according to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, “NFL clubs do compete with one
another off the field as well as on to acquire players, coaches, and management
personnel. In certain areas of the country where two teams operate in close
proximity, there is also competition for fan support, local television and local radio
revenues, and media space.”).
30
United States. v. Nat’l Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
31
Lance L. Kaiser, Revisiting the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961: A Call for
Equitable Antitrust Immunity from Section One of the Sherman Act for All
Professional Sports Leagues, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1237, 1243-44 (2005).
32
Id.; Bradley W. Crandall, The DirecTV NFL Sunday Ticket: An Economic
Plea for Antitrust Law Immunity, 79 WASH U. L.Q. 287, 296-98 (2001).
Sunday Ticket poses an interesting counterpoint to some of the support for
baseball’s proliferation of mega-money deals and RSNs as being “good for
business.” Most NFL fans simply love having the opportunity to go to their area
watering hole—or even to remain in the comfort of their own home—and to watch
every NFL game, each week, at their leisure. The RSN money coming into
baseball generally handicaps baseball and prevents MLB fans from enjoying such a
luxury. RSN/MLB cooperation has instituted blackout rules that would prevent a
subscriber of the MLB Extra Innings package (a similar programming model to
NFL Sunday Ticket) who lived in, say, Boston, from watching Red Sox games on
the Extra Innings broadcast, instead forcing that subscriber to purchase the New
England Sports Network separately in order to see the games. See How Are
Blackouts Determined for MLB EXTRA INNINGS, DIRECTV.COM,
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During the years after 1953, NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle began
to worry that the competitive balance of the league could be affected
by an individualized system—if the teams in the big markets got all
the big television money, then the smaller market teams would
obviously struggle to keep up—so the NFL decided to pursue a
course of “pooling” broadcasting rights and selling them as one big
contract, with revenues to be shared throughout the league.33
The decision in NFL 1, which found that some of the NFL’s
procedures had an acceptable business purpose but that other parts
were in fact unreasonable was considered by some to be vague, and
the NFL approached the court in 1961 seeking clarity before the
league attempted to enter into a “pooled rights” television contract
with CBS.34 The court in this subsequent case, known as “NFL 2,”
found that such a “pooled rights” situation would constitute an
antitrust violation and should be prohibited.35 Judge Grim, writing
for the court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, held that, in
essence, the NFL was seeking to give CBS the power to determine
which games should be telecast and where, which constituted an
agreement among all NFL teams to restrain the “trade” of NFL
games throughout the country.36 If this decision took hold in higher
courts and was left standing by the legislature, it would have changed
the entire course of sports broadcasting in this country and the way
http://support.directv.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/1723/~/how-are-blackoutsdetermined-for-mlb-extra-innings%3F (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
As much as fans love NFL Sunday Ticket, it is hard to imagine a Cowboys fan
deciding to up his subscription knowing that he could watch every NFL game each
Sunday except for his hometown team.
33
Ariel Y. Bublick, Are You Ready for Some Football?: How Antitrust Laws
Can be Used to Break Up DirecTV’s Exclusive Right to Telecast NFL’s Sunday
Ticket Package, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 223, 233 (2011).
34
Crandall, supra note 32, at 296; United States v. Nat’l Football League, 196
F. Supp. 445, 447 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
35
Nat’l Football League, 196 F. Supp. at 447.
36
Bublick, supra note 33, at 232-33.
The NFL argued that restricting the broadcasts of home games when the home
team was not on the road would boost home attendance (that logic will sound
familiar to modern day NFL fans of teams like the San Diego Chargers, who are
sometimes restricted from watching their home team’s games for reasons not
unlike the argument that Judge Grim shot down half a century ago). Id. at 231.
Judge Grim felt that the NFL was a “truly unique business enterprise,” and that this
type of restraint was a restriction. Id.
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that Americans watch football—the most popular sport in the
country.37 Every Sunday would be drastically different. “Pooled
broadcasts” like the ones at issue in the NFL cases are essentially
what we watch on CBS, FOX, and ESPN week in and week out.38
Congress did not take long to recognize this potentially damaging
situation for the relatively young league and acted quickly. Later that
same year, in 1961, Congress effectively gave the “big four”39 U.S.
sports a pass on Sherman Act antitrust violations as they related to
telecasting of the leagues’ contests.40 Virtually every subsequent

See Sean Leahy, Poll: NFL Beats Baseball Again as America’s Most
Popular
Sport,
USA
TODAY
(Jan.
25,
2011,
1:23
PM),
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/thehuddle/post/2011/01/poll-nfl-beatsbaseball-again-as-americas-most-popular-sport/1#.UTzj-L_ZOPU.
38
Id. at 235–36. Would the situation truly have been untenable? It is tough to
say. It would be hard to argue with a modern sports fan who—through the gift of
hindsight—might posit that the NFL would not have survived a “wild west” system
of broadcasting in the league’s early days. Baseball did survive a similar situation
for many years, although perhaps the competitive imbalance that Rozelle feared
might take hold in the NFL is the result that we have been left with in MLB.
Another point to consider is the different nature of the NFL as it relates to
broadcasting. An MLB season is a marathon: 162 games played in different
markets to considerably lower television audiences than the least-enthralling NFL
game of a season. See Craig Calcaterra, For the One Thousandth Time: NFL and
MLB TV Ratings are Apples and Oranges, NBC SPORTS: HARDBALL TALK (Feb. 8,
2011, 12:04 PM), http://hardballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/02/08/for-the-onethousandth-time-nfl-and-mlb-tv-ratings-are-apples-and-oranges (According to
Craig Calcaterra, “[t]he vast, vast majority of baseball games are consumed on a
local level. Fans watch their own teams’ games and rarely watch others. Why?
Because their team is on TV every day. The couple of national broadcasts a week
aren’t at all significant in comparison. Football, in contrast, is a nationallytelevised sport.”). With its sixteen games spread weekly onto a few select days, the
broadcasted game truly is king in the NFL. Id.
39
The “big four” is generally recognized to be professional football, baseball,
hockey, and basketball. Certainly, college sports, golf, NASCAR auto racing, and
others can lay claim to being more important to society than some of the “big
four”—hockey being the most assailable on that count.
40
Kaiser, supra note 31, at 1245. In its own words, Congress said that:
37

The antitrust laws . . . shall not apply to any joint agreement by
or among persons engaging in or conducting the organized
professional team sports of football, baseball, basketball, or
hockey, by which any league or clubs participating [in those four
sports] sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of
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sports broadcasting contract can trace its legal foundation back to the
SBA and this 1961 legislative action.
But it is not just CBS and other large, nationwide networks that
owe their sports-related success to the SBA. The RSN was born over
a decade after the SBA took effect. A collection of parent networks
and their affiliates began to gobble up local sports teams’ broadcast
rights.41
It took most of the last decade for the evolution of the RSN and
the IRSN to reach the point at which we now find ourselves. In the
1990s and early 2000s, the RSN was still a big money maker, but,
inferentially, it operated as much of the rest of the revenue making
processes in sports did. The better a team played, the more people
tuned in, the more fans in the seats, the more hats on the heads, et
cetera. As one sportswriter pointed out in the wake of the Dodgers’
television deal with Time Warner Cable, Magic Johnson and the
other owners down at Chavez ravine “will take in a huge amount of
cash just for putting a team on the field 162 times a year.”42 And this
payout, to the tune of a potential $8 billion, will continue for the next
twenty-five years.43 All teams would like to be in the Dodgers’ shoes
such league’s member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the
games . . . .
15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2011).
41
For a fascinating discussion of the Sports Broadcasting Act as it applies to
different aspects of antitrust issues within the four major U.S. sports, see Nathaniel
J. Grow, In Defense of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 49 AM. BUS. L. J. 211, 249
(2012) Nathaniel J. Grow’s In Defense of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption. Grow’s
analysis includes the following information:
The SBA grants each league a limited antitrust exemption for
purposes of jointly negotiating broadcast agreements for the
‘sponsored telecasting of [its] games.’ However, courts have
subsequently interpreted ‘sponsored telecasting’ to mean only
broadcasts on free, over-the-air networks, and, as a result, the
SBA does not protect the leagues' collective broadcast
agreements with cable providers.
Id.
42

See Richard Sandomir, Sweet TV Deal Will Taste Bitter to Fans, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/sports/baseball/dodgerssweet-tv-deal-will-taste-bitter-to-fans.html?ref=sports&_r=0.
43
Id.
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but, unfortunately, they simply cannot. They will have to compete
with them though, if they can.
In his 2007 book about the evolution of the Boston Red Sox and
the team’s renaissance under new ownership, author Seth Mnookin
described the wave of RSNs in baseball:
Most RSNs are independently owned and pay teams a
negotiated fee for the right to broadcast its games.
The success of team-owned RSNs [IRSNs] like NESN
has led other teams to adopt that model. In 2002, the
Yankees established the Yankees Entertainment and
Sports (YES) Network; previously, Yankees games
had been carried by the MSG Network. In 2006, the
New York Mets began broadcasting games on their
new regional network. It was partially in anticipation
of this that the Mets went on an expensive free-agent
acquisition spree the last several seasons, as they tried
to build a fan base for their cable network.44
Now, there are over forty RSNs in the United States.45 The two
most commonplace in American homes—both featured on virtually
every television provider’s sports package—are Comcast SportsNet
(CSN) and Fox Sports Net (FSN).46 These two RSNs and their
affiliates compete in most regions to acquire the rights to broadcast a
portion of—if not all of, as is common in today’s market—a local
sports team’s contests.47 This trend can be seen in almost every
region across the country. Try watching a sports contest in most U.S.
hotel rooms without having to locate the local CSN or FSN affiliate.
However widespread the CSN/FSN format might be, it is not
entirely uniform. Over the past two decades, a few individual teams
have branched out and acquired an ownership right in the television
networks showing their games. Again, we speak of the elite teams
that have the capital to make such an investment and, perhaps more
44

SETH MNOOKIN, FEEDING THE MONSTER: HOW MONEY, SMARTS, AND
NERVE TOOK A TEAM TO THE TOP 73 (SIMON & SCHUSTER 2007).
45
Diana Moss, Regional Sports Networks, Competition, and the Consumer, 21
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 56, 56 (2008).
46
Id.
47
See id. at 57.
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importantly, the fan interest and ratings to make that investment pay
dividends.48
IRSNs, in a form similar to the way that we recognize them now,
began to appear several years ago, with mixed early success. The
Memphis Grizzlies’ attempt at launching The Grizzlies Regional
48

While the Yankees and their YES Network, and the University of Texas and
its Longhorn Network, may be the most dynamic examples to analyze, they are not
alone on that frontier. The Boston Red Sox own an eighty percent stake in the New
England Sports Network (“NESN”) and capitalize on this investment partially
through the team’s natural ability to draw eyeballs to television screens. Boston
Red Sox on the Forbes MLB Team Valuations List, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/teams/boston-red-sox (last visited Apr. 73, 2013).
In a recent book published about the “new era” of Red Sox ownership, Seth
Mnookin describes the appeal of an RSN like NESN. MNOOKIN, supra note 44, at
733. Mnookin wrote the following about the new owners’ thinking in purchasing
the Red Sox:
In addition to the baseball club, the Red Sox sale included
Fenway Park, which the team owned, and the team’s 80 percent
stake in NESN, the regional sports network that broadcasts Red
Sox and Boston Bruins hockey games. Over the previous
decade, regional sports networks—or RSNs—had become
increasingly profitable, and NESN was the crown jewel of the
bunch. In fact, to many of the parties interested in bidding for
the Red Sox, NESN was the main draw. While the Red Sox
themselves might turn a profit or a loss of a couple of million
dollars in any given year, NESN, whose profits were not
supposed to be subject to baseball’s revenue-sharing agreements,
was seen as a likely cash cow. The Red Sox had a monopoly on
baseball fans in most of New England, and NESN was usually
the only way those fans could watch their team play. The
potential for advertising revenue was enormous.
Id.
Red Sox owner John Henry poses an especially interesting study in the value
of owning one’s own sports network. Not only are Henry’s Red Sox games
broadcasted on the network, but NESN also showcases the Liverpool Football
Club, an English soccer team of which Henry also owns a controlling stake, raising
that team’s profile in the United States and—at least in theory—raising revenues
across the board. Liverpool FC News, Schedule, Scores, Statistics, Video,
NESN.COM, http://nesn.com/liverpool-fc (last visited Apr. 83, 2012). In 2012, you
could even see Liverpool F.C. play a game of soccer at Fenway Park, the 100-yearold home of the Boston Red Sox.
Football at Fenway, REDSOX.COM,
http://boston.redsox.mlb.com/bos/ticketing/footballatfenway.jsp (last visited Apr.
83, 2013). That this game was broadcast on NESN goes without saying.

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

318

33-1

Sports Network failed before it began, and the Minnesota Twinsowned Victory Sports channel closed its doors after only six months,
due to the Twins’ inability to reach agreements with local
distributors.49 Over the past decade, as detailed above, a strong
collection of a few elite teams have begun to carve out their own
defined area in their local broadcasting market. Primarily, this
innovation took place in baseball, with several MLB teams obtaining
at least a partial interest in their respective RSN. It has spread into
other sports, though—most notably with the recent inception of the
leviathan that is The Longhorn Network.
III. SPORTS BROADCASTING AND THE NCAA
College football and its individual teams do not enjoy the SBA
protections afforded to the four major “professional” sports; they
instead derive their freedom to make certain broadcasting decisions
from case law.50 In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma, the most influential case on this topic, the Supreme Court
held that the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA)
restrictions on the number and type of games that an individual
school could make available to the viewing public constituted
“unreasonable horizontal restraints.”51

49

Moss, supra note 45, at 57–58. Observing the financial situation in
basketball, as far as television deals and parity is concerned, is akin to looking upon
a serene lake (let’s say that the MLB is Niagara Falls). There have been some
contentious moments in the past few years, such as NBA Commissioner David
Stern’s executive veto of a trade between the New Orleans Hornets and the Los
Angeles Lakers, wherein Stern cited the best interests of the league as his
motivation; but for the most part the NBA has parity and revenue sharing under
relatively tight control. See Howard Beck, N.B.A. Rejects Trade Sending Paul to
Lakers,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
8,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/sports/basketball/paul-set-to-join-lakers-aspart-of-3-team-deal.html?_r=0.
A successfully managed RSN in the NBA—the Lakers being a prime
example—would still wield many benefits, but the tightly managed NBA salary
cap prevents the topsy-turvy parity issues that plague the MLB. See Mark Deeks,
Parity? The N.B.A. Already Has It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2011, 3:45 PM),
http://offthedribble.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/19/parity-the-n-b-a-already-has-it.
50
Kaiser, supra note 31, at 1251-52.
51
Id.; NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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The 1984 decision, written by Justice Stevens, gave the benefit of
the doubt to the NCAA in its analysis, dissecting the issues as if the
NCAA had only the purest of intentions and was acting to protect the
integrity of its sports and to have a “procompetitive” effect.52 Justice
Stevens’ analysis, well-reasoned and comprehensive, concluded that
there were not substantial competitive benefits to the NCAA’s
restricting the broadcast of schools’ games in such a way.53 Justice
Stevens was careful to support the regulatory body’s actions, which
were made in order to preserve tradition and maintain the integrity of
the NCAA, noting that “the role of the NCAA must be to preserve a
tradition that might otherwise die.”54 However, Justice Stevens
concluded, “rules that restrict output are hardly consistent with this
role.”55
The financial makeup of the various college sports conferences
under the NCAA umbrella is complex but, ultimately, most
conferences operate under a “rising tides lifts all boats” approach:
A conference can also attempt to control its members’
actions through the media rights and revenues that the
conference receives from those contracts. The first
step is to share revenue equally. When each member
of the conference receives equal revenue from the
media contracts, it is in the best interest of each school
to want stability and exposure for all of the other
members of the conference. When one school makes
more money, all of the member schools make more
money. The Pac-12, the Big Ten, the Southeastern
Conference, and the ACC all share media revenue
equally amongst their members. In October 2011, the
Big 12 also agreed to share revenue equally. This

52

Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 114.
Id. at 1176 (stating that, while it is “reasonable to assume that most of the
regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition
among amateur athletic teams and therefore procompetitive because they enhance
public interest in intercollegiate athletics. The specific restraints on football
telecasts that are challenged in this case do not, however, fit into the same mold . . .
.”).
54
Id. at 120.
55
Id.
53
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agreement means that the schools will share all
revenue from Tier I and Tier II broadcast rights for
football and mens’ basketball. However, it allows
schools to keep revenue from Tier III network rights,
which includes Texas’ Longhorn Network.56
This revenue distribution will be key to the decisions that major
schools might make in the future. Conference realignments, which
have been commonplace of late, are not likely to settle down in the
coming years, and while most big schools are presently attuned to the
benefits that come with a big, conference-wide television agreement,
it is easy to see how the allure of retaining 100% of the profit from
“Tier III” network rights could be overwhelming.57
The appeal of retaining these revenues has convinced at least one
major university to try to go it alone. On August 26, 2011, the
Longhorn Network took to the airwaves.58 The network, owned
jointly by ESPN and the University of Texas, is completely dedicated
to Texas athletics—a first in college sports broadcasting.59 Until the
Longhorn Network debuted, college sports broadcasting had only
experienced broader conference-specific channels.60
Not all of the early feedback was positive. Some critics saw the
ESPN and University of Texas’ plan to air high school football
games on the Longhorn Network as an attempt to gain an improper
advantage in recruiting.61 Even University of Texas’ head football
coach Mack Brown has not been entirely satisfied with the network.62
Benjamin I. Leibovitz, Avoiding the Sack: How Nebraska’s Departure From
the Big 12 Changed College Football and What Athletic Conferences Must do to
Prevent Defection in the Future, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 675, 6918–929 (2012).
57
Id.
58
Jason Cohen, With Texas Network, U.T. Remakes the Playing Field, N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
3,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/us/04ttsports.html?_r=0.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Tom Spousta, Rivals See Unfair Edge in Longhorn TV Network, N.Y. TIMES
(July 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/27/sports/ncaafootball/big-12rivals-see-unfair-recruiting-edge-in-longhorn-network.html.
62
Dom Cosentino, Even Mack Brown Hates the Longhorn Network, DEADSPIN
(Oct. 22, 2011, 6:40 PM), http://deadspin.com/5953938/even-mack-brown-hatesthe-longhorn-network.
56
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Brown was quoted as saying that he felt “overexposed” by the
network, explaining, “I’ve got a microphone on every time I talk to
the team . . . I didn’t ask for it. We were given a deal we had no
input in.”63
It has been reported that the Texas Longhorn athletics program
will gain revenues of approximately $15 million each year from the
Longhorn Network.64 Such a figure does not begin to reflect the
value that such an enterprise can have. Simply increasing the
“number of eyeballs” that see Longhorn football will be a benefit to
the school’s reputation, leading to a growth in its fan base, its
reputation, and even greater growth in its coffers.
For now, the Longhorn Network seems to have reached a position
of stable, if uneasy, success. What potential issues could arise?
College sports, unlike professional sports and the more rigidlydefined antitrust laws that apply to them, are essentially testing the
boundaries as they go. College athletics seems to currently be in a
state of flux, and it will be fascinating to track the developments and
see where things go next. Will there be more independent networks?
The financial strength that comes from these networks might be
enough to cause some schools to go fully independent and leave their
conferences altogether, weakening the conference system that has
defined college sports for generations. After all, realignment is really
all about the money at the end of the day. Other schools will be
looking to the University of Texas to see when and if they might
want to try branching out on their own into this brave new world.
IV. IRSNS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL – A RICH MAN’S GAME?
With a few notable exceptions, the IRSN advances made in the
MLB—where, out of the four major sports, they are most commonly
found—have been made by the wealthiest, most popular, and most

63

Id.
Josephine R. Potuto, They Take Classes, Don’t They?: Restructuring a
College Football Post Season, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 311, 32211, n.66 (2012) (citing
Jonathan Woo, Big 12, FOX Agree to TV Deal, THE HORN (Apr. 14, 2011),
http://www.readthehorn.com/sports/4022/big_xii_fox_agree_to_tv_deal
(last
updated Apr. 21, 2011)).
64
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influential clubs.65 The Dodgers are on the verge of making waves,
one way or another, in their RSN/IRSN decision; the Boston Red Sox
have an 80% ownership stake in their local RSN, New England
Sports Network; the New York Mets own more than half of
SportsNet New York; and Yankees have the YES Network.66 The
current character of the IRSNs in baseball is probably owed to the
fact that creating one takes a substantial amount of capital, whereas
simply selling a team’s rights in a more traditional vein costs very
little. Still, the benefits are clear.67

65

An interesting exception to this trend is the recent turn of events that
transpired between the Baltimore Orioles and the Washington Nationals, and the
two teams’ mutual RSN deal. Orioles’ owner Peter Angelos had long fought for
decades —for decades—to keep a second team from moving into the beltway. See
Maury Brown, Bizball: Inside the MASN/Nationals Television Contract Dispute,
BASEBALL
PROSPECTUS
(June
25,
2012),
http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=17468 (detailing the
history of the television contract concerning Angelos’s Orioles and the Washington
Nationals, including the fact that, at the deal’s inception, Angelos was taking in
90% of the station’s broadcast revenues).
Angelos felt that a team in the nation’s capital would cut into his revenues.,
Id., Hand he was able to keep the proponents of placing a team in D.C. at bay for
years. Id. Finally, when a team was placed in D.C., Angelos was able to finagle an
obscenely beneficial RSN deal in his favor, in which the Orioles would retain such
a large percentage of the ownership of the network that they would essentially be
making money off of the Nationals. Id. Over the coming years, as a part of the
broadcast contract language, the Nationals’ ownership stake in the network will
gradually increase up to 33%. Id.
66
See Jonah Keri, How a Television Contract Could Launch a Rangers
Dynasty,
GRANTLAND
(Sept.
7,
2011),
http://www.grantland.com/story/_/id/6939177/how-television-launch-rangersdynasty.
Keri notes that, even with the clear benefits that the Rangers will receive from
itstheir massive deal with an RSN, Fox Sports Southwest, the team considered
creating an IRSN of itstheir own, but was unable to because of the precarious
financial situation that the team’s owners found themselves in after they assumed
control. Id.
The team was still able to wrangle a ten to fifteen percent ownership interest in
Fox Sports Southwest. See Tom Van Riper, TV Money is a Game Changer for
Baseball and the Dodgers, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2012, 12:28 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomvanriper/2012/03/21/the-new-moneyball (“Local
television has become a financial game-changer that dwarfs all others.”).
67
See Keri, supra note 66. Keri writes that:
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And what are these benefits? Well, sheer unadulterated profit, for
one thing. Forbes values the Yankees organization at approximately
$1 billion more than it was about ten years ago when the YES
Network was founded.68
These benefits are not confined to the money that a team takes in
directly from the spike in viewership it gets to its product when it
creates its own RSN. Simply the possibility of a team making its
own Regional Sports Network is enough to drive actual established
RSNs, like FOX Sports or Comcast, into a feeding frenzy. 69 A
survey of the recent history illustrates this trend, as teams’ broadcast
rights attract a series of bidding wars between hopeful broadcasters.
In a recent Forbes article, the seller’s market and the battle between
providers was described in detail:
The best things that baseball owners now have going
for them are Fox and its war with various cable
providers. The former craves the local content for its
channels, the latter believes in sports as a retention
hook for its service. In Houston, Comcast gave new
Astros owner Jim Crane an equity stake and a huge
bump in rights fees to wrest it away from Fox, whose
current deal dates back to 2005. Meanwhile in San
Diego, Fox has drawn the Padres away from Cox
Communications with a huge fee increase and 20% of
a new regional network.70

[f]or teams like Pittsburgh and Tampa Bay, it might be a case of
the poor getting poorer, while the rich gain a chance to get richer.
But where six or seven years ago maybe 10 teams could have
realistically built their own RSNs, Gennaro estimates that 20 or
more could do it today.
Id.
See Van Riper, supra note 66 (“As the YES Network celebrates its ten-year
anniversary in 2012, the Yankees are worth over $1 billion more than they were the
day it launched: FORBES pegs valuation growth to a current $1.85 billion from
$730 million since then.”).
69
Id.
70
Id.
68
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V. WHO’S GETTING LEFT BEHIND – AND WILL ANYONE GO BACK
FOR THEM?
The parallels between the quickly evolving world of IRSN
ownership—and even of RSN cash-ins caused by this mad
scramble—and the “rich get richer” world that Commissioner
Rozelle forecasted when he approached the court system fifty years
ago are clear. More for some has, thus far, meant more for a few
others as well. But it has not necessarily meant more for all. More
importantly, it cannot mean more for all. Part of the reason why the
Dodgers having more money from ownership translates into the team
having a better television deal, and being an overall more successful
franchise, is because they can put that money back on the field.71
In a recent article for ESPN.com, baseball writer Buster Olney
detailed the November 2012 trade between the Toronto Blue Jays and
the fire sale-happy Miami Marlins.72 In the trade, the Marlins—in an
effort to slash salaries and save money—sent a plethora of superstars
and highly paid players to Toronto for a slew of cheap minor
leaguers. The trade sent shockwaves throughout professional
baseball, causing many sportswriters to cry foul about the league’s
systemic flaws, and it caused others to predict that Marlins fans
might even boycott attending their own team’s games.73 Olney
surveyed what he saw as a potentially fractured “have” and “havenot” future in MLB: “two officials say that as clubs like the Los
Angeles Angels, Texas Rangers and Dodgers gain more revenue
through local television deals and the gap between the Haves and

71

This should already be apparent in the way that the Dodgers have begun to
outspend—quite literally—every other team in baseball since the Guggenheim
Group assumed control.
72
Buster Olney, Miami Deal Embarassing for Team, MLB, ESPN (NOV. 14,
2012,
9:10
AM),
http://insider.espn.go.com/mlb/blog/_/name/olney_buster/id/8630571/miamimarlins-conned-fans-politicians-mlb-stadium-deal-subsequent-transactions-mlb.
73
See Michelle Kaufman, How Will the Miami Marlins’ Trade Affect Ticket
Sales?,
MIAMI
HERALD
(Nov.
15,
2012),
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/11/15/3097842/how-will-the-miami-marlinstrade.html (“After the Marlins’ trade of much of their talent on Tuesday, not only
might they suffer on the field, but they might suffer at the box office as well.”).
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Have-Nots grows, other teams will be faced with the same choice as
the Marlins very soon.”74
Competitive balance has always been, and will always be, a twoway street. There is a direct, natural correlation between the
broadcast viewership and market size of the “rich teams” and how
much they can and will expend on the field product. Thus, it follows
quite reasonably that the product in the small markets will only
continue to get worse.75 There is money to be had in broadcast deals,
for lots of teams. But there is a limit to this windfall. Small markets
will inevitably suffer,76 unless the league takes action. Action may
not be necessitated at this very instant, but it will inevitably be
required at some point in the future.77 Which brings about the only
next logical question: what can the league do?
The question of whether the SBA can be extended to apply to the
RSN and IRSN dealings of individual sports leagues is unsettled, but
most scholars believe that authorities would have trouble enforcing
any restrictions under the SBA as it is structured.78 It has generally
been decided that the SBA applies only to “sponsored telecasting”—
meaning broadcasting that goes over the airwaves—not cable, as
most Americans receive their sports programming.79 RSNs and
See Olney, supra note 72. Olney argues that, “[a]s the current labor deal
runs its course, some baseball executives predict, there will be significant
infighting between the two camps—the Haves and Have-Nots—and the Marlins’
sell-off may have been the precursor of all of that.” Id.
75
Competitive balance is already a true problem in Major League Baseball,
only recently corrected—to some extent—by the revolution in scouting and
evaluating talent that has allowed smaller payroll teams to hang tough with the big
spenders around the league. See Mark Koba, How Small-Market Teams Survive
Baseball
Economics,
CNBC
(Jan.
30,
2012,
1:10
PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/45960981/How_SmallMarket_Teams_Survive_Baseball_
Economics.
76
Some would say, continue to suffer.
77
Whether this is five, ten, or twenty years away depends on how strongly one
perceives the importance of competitive balance—on and off the field—to be in
baseball.
78
Moss, supra note 45, at 72–73.
79
Id. See also Bublick, supra note 33, at 233 (stating that the most important
phrase in the SBA is “‘sponsored telecasting,’ which courts have construed to mean
that the SBA only applies to broadcast television and not to cable or satellite.”);
Crandall, supra note 32, at 297–98 (“[t]he legislative history of the SBA indicates
that Congress, by specifically addressing ‘sponsored telecasting’ of professional
74
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IRSN channels are almost universally shipped off through cable and
satellite packages and not the SBA-protected “sponsored telecasting.”
So, if the SBA cannot allow sports leagues to take actions as they
relate to teams and IRSN/RSN development without cognizance of
standard antitrust issues and vulnerability, the choices for the leagues
in policing these issues become much more limited. Therefore, any
potential strictures and regulations that sports leagues might try to
impose upon individual teams and/or conferences as they attempt to
branch out and achieve greater individual profits would most likely
have to be undertaken in some way that would not violate antitrust
regulations.
As previously noted, the greatest advancement in the area of
IRSNs has been made in Major League Baseball.80 Inherently,
baseball is also the most susceptible to problematic developments.81
Oddly enough, baseball also boasts the most unique history of
antitrust regulation. While still affected by the SBA as the other four
major sports are, baseball’s true “antitrust” exemption is different
than the exemption possessed by its “big four”82 brethren—baseball’s
sports contests in the language of the SBA, intended to exempt the sale of pooled
broadcast packages to free television networks only.”).
80
See
MLB’s
Biggest
Cable
Deals,
FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/pictures/mlh45if/future-of-local-deals (last visited Feb. 9,
2013).
81
See Olney, supra note 72.
82
Not discussed in this article is the rich history of soccer and broadcasting
issues/antitrust violations. There have been issues both foreign and domestic that
scholars have wrangled with for years, the most notable being whether Major
League Soccer (“MLS”) in the United States represented a “single entity” for
purposes of antitrust litigation. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284
F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002).
In Fraser, MLS players joined together to sue the league, arguing that the
league’s owners violated antitrust laws by agreeing not to compete in free agency
for the services of certain players. Id. at 54-55. In addition, the players alleged that
MLS had attempted to monopolize the market for player services in the U.S. Id. at
55. The District Court in Fraser found that MLS was a single entity, and thus
could not really be guilty of violating the applicable antitrust laws as alleged by the
plaintiffs. See Robert M. Bernhard, MLS’ Designated Player Rule: Has David
Beckham Single-Handedly Destroyed Soccer’s Single-Entity Antitrust Defense?, 18
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 413, 422–23 (2008).
On appeal, the First Circuit essentially said that MLS represented a “‘hybrid
arrangement’ somewhere between a single-entity and a collaboration of existing
independent competitors.” Id. at 424. In his article for the Marquette Sports Law
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exemption has been judicially crafted and refined for almost a
century.83
VI. THE “BUSINESS OF BASEBALL” AND BASEBALL’S ANTI-TRUST
EXEMPTION
Baseball is unique from the other sports in many ways. In this
day and age, football is certainly more popular than baseball.84

Review, Robert Bernhard summarized the rather obtuse history of Fraser and how
it might affect soccer in the United States in the future:
Major League Soccer's limited-liability company structure and
various organizational features allowed it to win summary
judgment in its single-entity defense in the district court's hearing
of Fraser. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on grounds of
relevant market, refusing to answer the single-entity question
definitively. The players argued, and some scholars have agreed,
that MLS's single-entity structure as a limited liability company
is simply a “sham” designed to circumvent antitrust law, and
even the First Circuit expressed doubt as to whether MLS should
properly be deemed a single-entity or whether some sort of
hybrid definition is more applicable. Regardless, no court has
expressly overruled the district court's finding that MLS is a
single-entity. Consequently, for various reasons, where other
professional sports leagues failed in single-entity defenses, MLS
succeeded.
Id. at 431.
“Across the pond,” the success of the English Premier League and its relatively
egalitarian broadcasting regulations is causing some in America to take notice. See
Clarke, supra note 10, at 624 (stating that “in the Premier League, a balance is still
struck between maintaining some level of financial parity between clubs, yet
incentivizing teams to finish as high as possible . . . . The success of the Premier
League's system of distribution accounts for seven out of the 20 clubs in the Money
League being English. Success of this system is also evidenced by the Italians' and
Spanish shift from individual rights selling to collective selling and distribution.”).
83
Kaiser, supra note 31, at 1253.
84
See Christine Brennan, Baseball Still Takes a Back Seat to the NFL, USA
TODAY
(Oct.
5,
2011,
11:57
PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/columnist/brennan/story/2011-1005/baseball-football-nfl-viewership-fans/50671798/1 (featuring an interview with
MLB Commissioner Bud Selig, discussing the embarrassment of how a “football
pregame show was watched by more people than either of the first two Yankees-
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Basketball is cooler, and its popularity growing with more alacrity on
both a domestic and global level.85 But baseball is the “American
Pastime,” for whatever that term continues to be worth—which might
just be quite a bit. The sport is unique not just in its product and
popularity, but on a legal level as well. Baseball is in possession of a
rather unassailable antitrust exemption that no other sport
possesses.86 While many of the other sports fall under the regulatory
framework of legislative actions passed down by lawmakers—the
Sports Broadcasting Act included—baseball is in possession of a
judicially crafted exemption, which has left it free to act with
virtually absolute impunity for almost a century.87 Of the long string

Tigers postseason games. Or any of the other series, which included the bigmarket Phillies and Rangers . . . Americans are big-events fans now more than
ever, and the NFL has intelligently marketed itself as the ultimate big deal.”).
85
See Dustin C. Lane, From Mao to Yao: A New Game Plan for China in the
Era of Basketball Globalization, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 127, 138 (2004)
(discussing the globalization of basketball with a focus on Yao Ming and the
advent of American basketball in China, and an in-depth look at some of the issues
involved.).“Basketball is booming in China,” Lane writes. Id.
Basketball continues to grow in China, but the NBA is also reaching out in
other communities around the world, helping to fuel basketball’s global growth.
See Jeremy Kahn, N.B.A. in India, in Search of Fans and Players, NY TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/28/sports/basketball/28india.html (last visited
Feb. 9, 2013) (“This season, the league will play its first regular-season games in
Europe, a two-game matchup in March between the Nets and the Toronto Raptors
in London. And having conquered China, the N.B.A. has its sights fixed on Asia’s
other big emerging market: India.”). See also Alicia Jessop, The Surge of the
NBA’s International Viewership and Popularity, FORBES (June 14, 2012, 12:42
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aliciajessop/2012/06/14/the-surge-of-the-nbasinternational-viewership-and-popularity (discussing a “surge of international
interest” in the NBA).
86
See Mary K. Braza, The Eleventh Circuit Uses Baseball Antitrust Exemption
And The Fourth Amendment to Shut Down An Antitrust Investigation, 11 No. 2
ANDREWS ANTITRUST LITIG. REP. 18, 18–19 (2003).
87
See H. Ward Classen, Three Strikes and You’re Out: An Investigation of
Professional Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 21 AKRON L. REV. 369, 369–70
(1988) (“The Supreme Court's decision in Federal Baseball Club v. National
League removed professional baseball from federal antitrust scrutiny in contrast to
all other professional sports, placing professional baseball in a unique position.
The Federal Baseball decision has allowed professional baseball to mature without
the concern of acting in restraint of trade. It has also spawned a body of case law
that defies traditional legal reasoning and creates great disparity among different
professional sports.”).
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of cases that professional baseball can count as legal victories against
challenges of all types of impropriety, three are widely considered to
be the most important. A better understanding of these three cases,
and the antitrust history of Major League Baseball in its entirety, is
helpful in understanding the immense power that the sport can wield
and why it should be able to stamp out parity-destroying deals88
before they take effect.
The first case in this trinity, in which a zealous judge first
established Major League Baseball’s antitrust immunity, is known as
Federal Baseball89 or “FBC.” In Federal Baseball, the Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore brought suit against the National League,
alleging anti-trust issues.90 The Baltimore team, once content to be a
member of its own league—separate from the more established
National League—filed its lawsuit after, according to the Baltimore
team, the National League systematically began buying up the other
teams in Baltimore’s league, leaving Baltimore with no one to play,
and thus, no reason to exist.91 Essentially, the Baltimore ball club
argued that the actions of the National League amounted to an
exercise of monopoly power over the business of baseball.92
In determining whether antitrust laws should in fact apply to the
teams competing in professional baseball, Justice Holmes found that
professional baseball was not an interstate affair, and thus could
avoid regulation.93 Even though teams crossed, and in fact, had to

88

Or better yet, to repair the ineffective revenue sharing system that is
currently in place, which contributes to the lack of competitive balance within the
sport.
89
Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200 (1922).
90
Id. at 206–08.
91
Id. at 207–08.
92
Id. at 207.
93
Id. at 209.
Holmes’s perplexing opinion has been interpreted in several different ways
since the day it was passed down, even though the general principle that baseball is
exempt from antitrust laws has weathered virtually every storm. The actual text is
instructive. In the opinion, Holmes wrote that:
The business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely
state affairs. It is true that in order to attain for these exhibitions
the great popularity that they have achieved, competitions must
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cross, state lines as a function of contesting games of baseball, “the
transport is a mere incident, not the essential thing,” Holmes wrote.94
Furthermore, even though the ultimate aim of the contests was to
make money, professional baseball itself was not “trade or
commerce,” according to the Court.95 Therefore, given that MLB did
not constitute interstate commerce, it could not be subject to the
regulations that the Baltimore club was attempting to hold it to.96
Federal Baseball remains one of the more confounding decisions
in the history of the Court, but it is difficult to understate its
ramifications for the future of sport in American society.97
Several decades later, the holding of Federal Baseball was more
or less affirmed by the Supreme Court in Toolson.98 The Court
refused to take affirmative steps in regards to baseball’s antitrust
exemption, opting instead to hold that if Congress had not seen fit to
counteract the effects of Federal Baseball, then it must have done so
with a reason.99 That the Court would maintain baseball’s antitrust
exemption is not a terribly difficult concept to grasp; how the Court
could maintain that, in 1953, when professional baseball was still

be arranged between clubs from different cities and States. But
the fact that in order to give the exhibitions the Leagues must
induce free persons to cross state lines and must arrange and pay
for their doing so is not enough to change the character of the
business.
Fed. Baseball Club, 259 U.S. at 208-09.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Congress may have been attempting, in part, to remedy some of this
confusion when it passed the Curt Flood Act in 1998. See Morgan A. Sullivan, A
Derelict in the Stream of the Law: Overruling Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 48
DUKE L.J. 1265, 1266 (1999) (arguing that “Congress presumably eliminated the
confusion surrounding the exemption's application to players' labor disputes when
it passed the Curt Flood Act of 1998,” but that the “limited and unsettled impact of
the Curt Flood Act actually reinvigorates the debate over the scope of the original
antitrust exemption.”).
98
Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
99
Id. at 357.
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neither an interstate activity nor actual commerce worthy of
regulation, is a much more confusing premise.100
In Flood v. Kuhn,101 a 1972 Burger Court opinion, the boundaries
of free agency were tested, and thus the ability of MLB to control its
product was defined—or perhaps more aptly, redefined—with lasting
implications.102 It was to be arguably the most influential judicial

100

Id. at 357–60 (Burton, J., dissenting). Justices Burton and Reed dissented
from the per curiam opinion of the Court in Toolson, clearly voicing their opinions
that to hold that baseball was not an interstate, commercial enterprise was
ludicrous. Id. at 357 (Burton, J., dissenting). “[I]t is a contradiction in terms,” the
dissenting Justices wrote, “to say that the defendants in the cases before us are not
now engaged in interstate trade or commerce as those terms are used in the
Constitution of the United States and in the Sherman Act.” Id. at 358 (Burton, J.,
dissenting).
101
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
102
The judicial history of the Flood opinion is among one of the most
fascinating—and sardonic—in history. The opinion’s author, Justice Blackmun,
had spent the majority of the 1972 term laboring over his authorship of the so
called “abortion opinions.” BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 186–93 (1979).
Flood was the first time that Blackmun exited a conference as the senior
member of a majority—a position that allowed him to select the writer of the
opinion—he chose himself with no real hesitation. Id. at 188. Justice Blackmun,
noted for his tireless research and attention to detail—sometimes at the expense of
reasonable timeliness and to the frustration of his fellow Justices—had become
exhausted with his work on the abortion issue, and he relished the opportunity to
indulge his own love of baseball’s history with a quixotic opinion. Id.
What Blackmun ultimately published was more of a lengthy ode to his love of
the sport than an analysis of antitrust law and baseball’s path for the future. Id. at
190–92. Bob Woodward, who studied the Court for near a decade while creating
his book, “The Brethren,” described the opinion thusly:
In three extended paragraphs, [Blackmun] traced the history of
professional baseball. He continued with a list of “the many
names, celebrated for one reason or another, that have sparked
the diamond and its environs and that have provided . . . for
recaptured thrills, for reminiscence and comparisons, and for
conversation and anticipation in season and off season: Ty Cobb,
Babe Ruth . . . .” There were more than seventy names. “The list
seems endless,” Blackmun wrote. He paid homage to the verse
“Casey at the Bat,” and other baseball literature. When he had
finished, Blackmun circulated the draft. [Justice] Brenann was
surprised. He thought Blackmun had been in the library
researching the abortion cases, not playing with baseball cards.
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opinion in American professional sports history, but it had a rather
inauspicious beginning within the Court itself.103
In Flood, Curt Flood, an MLB player regarded as one of the
premier centerfielders in the league with the St. Louis Cardinals, took
issue with his team summarily trading him to another team, against
Flood’s own personal wishes and his preference to remain—along
with his family—in St. Louis, where he had built a life for himself.104
Flood was not consulted about the trade and given no notice that he
had been traded—and, inherently, needed to move—to
Philadelphia.105 Flood complained to the Commissioner of MLB,
specifically asking that he be contractually released from his contract
with the Cardinals and made a “free agent,” giving him the freedom
to determine on his own where he should play; the request was
denied.106
The subsequent antitrust suit, filed by Flood in the Southern
District of New York, named virtually everyone in a position of
power within MLB as a defendant.107 Flood’s message was clear:
baseball had been acting unilaterally and with a despotic flair in its
management of the game. Flood’s argument spoke in immediate
terms about the use of players, but his reasoning is transferable to the
league’s treatment of teams, stadiums, and, it stands to reason,
television deals.108
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, held that, “[w]ith its
reserve system enjoying exemption from federal antitrust laws,

Id. at 190.
Other justices eventually lobbied Blackmun—most likely with a sarcasm
undetected by Blackmun himself—to have their own favorite baseball players
added to the list (Blackmun would weigh the attributes of each player, in earnest,
before deciding whether or not they deserved inclusion in his own judiciallycrafted Hall of Fame). Id. at 190–91.
103
Id. at 186–92.
104
Flood, 407 U.S. at 264 (highlighting that Flood was a seven-time “Gold
Glove” award winner, a strong hitter, and a designated team captain during his time
with the Cardinals).
105
Id.
106
Id
107
Id. Flood sued the Commissioner of Baseball, the presidents of the two
major leagues, and the twenty-four major league clubs. Id.
108
Flood, 407 U.S. at 264.
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baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly.
Federal Baseball and Toolson have become an aberration confined to
baseball.”109 But, the Court decided, this aberration was worth
maintaining.
Turning specifically to the radio and television broadcasting
issues that Justice Blackmun could see looming on the horizon,
Blackmun wrote that the “advent of radio and television, with their
consequent increased coverage and additional revenues, has not
occasioned an overruling of Federal Baseball and Toolson.”110 In so
stating, Blackmun was not just making an aside about the effect of
sports broadcasting on antitrust issues in professional sports, but also
reiterating a powerful assumption that his opinion made:
Congressional inaction in the decades after Federal Baseball and
Toolson represented a tacit approval,111 by Congress, of the
principles of those two cases and warranted upholding baseball’s
antitrust exemption absent Congressional mandate.112
The conclusion of this long string of cases, stretching over
several decades, can be succinctly summarized in one of the last
clauses of Blackmun’s Flood opinion. Congress had no intention,
Blackmun held, “of including the business of baseball within the
scope of the federal antitrust laws.”113 Players, like Curt Flood,114
could and would continue to be traded.115 And, this article argues,

109

Id. at 282.
Id. at 283.
111
Congress’ tacit approval was known as “the positive inaction doctrine.”
Sullivan, supra note 97, at 1267.
112
Id. at 1278–80.
113
Flood, 407 U.S. at 285 (quoting Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S.
346, 357 (1953)).
114
Flood, in some small consolation, was granted the privilege of being the
namesake for the 1998 “Curt Flood Act” passed by Congress. Curt Flood Act of
1998, Pub.L. 105–297, Oct. 27, 1998, 112 Stat. 2824 (1998).
115
There were many moments in the future of free agency, leading to the much
more player-friendly system that we have now; some of them only shortly after the
Flood decision. See William B. Gould IV, Globalization in Collective Bargaining,
Baseball, and Matsuzaka: Labor and Antitrust Law on the Diamond, 28 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y 283, 284–95 (2007); see also Susan H. Seabury, The Development
and Role of Free Agency in Major League Baseball, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 335
(1998) (tracing the history of Major League Baseball’s free agent system and Jim
“Catfish” Hunter’s successful fight to become the first modern “free agent”).
110
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even though players are now given more freedom in their
movements, the Court’s reasoning would still allow Major League
Baseball to take greater steps to monitor and regulate the business
affairs of its teams—including issues relating to broadcast television
contracts—in the best interests of our national pastime.
VII.

APPLYING THE ESTABLISHED LAW TO INCREASE REGULATION
IN BASEBALL – A DECISION THEY JUST WON’T MAKE

Having established that baseball’s antitrust exemption is virtually
beyond reproach, the next question we must ask is, does baseball’s
judicial exemption provide a window of opportunity for MLB to step
in and regulate the television/broadcast dealings of its teams for the
benefit of the league as a whole? The baseball commissioner has the
power to review trades and determine whether they are fair or “in the
best interests of the game.”116 One has to assume that sooner or later
it is going to become apparent to Commissioner Selig—or to
subsequent commissioners—that the “unfair” aspects of the game are
the product of a potentially broken system. This does not mean that
baseball should stop teams from making money, but MLB might be
able to influence how teams use that money, to the ultimate benefit of
the league as a whole.
Will they be able to act? This article argues that they will be, and
actually are presently, able to act. The more appropriate question is,
“why don’t they act?”
Baseball’s antitrust exemption, though it might be of muddled
lineage, still lives. It is the strongest antitrust shield in professional
sports and perhaps one of the strongest in American business.
But, in an interesting dichotomy, the game with perhaps the
greatest ability to control its image, its teams, and its league as a
whole, chooses not to.
One explanation for baseball’s lack of action may be the sport’s
commissioner.117 While the National Football League is managed by
See Forward, supra note 9, at 7–8 (“The commissioner has the power to act
‘in the best interests of baseball.’ Thus, the commissioner has the authority to
investigate acts, transactions, or practices considered ‘not in the best interests of
baseball.’”).
117
Perhaps of some interest to this article’s readers, Selig, unlike some of his
predecessors who have served as MLB Commissioner, is not an attorney.
116
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the firm (some would say draconian) measures of Roger Goodell, and
the National Basketball Association is currently enjoying its last year
under the stewardship of the roundly respected David Stern, baseball
has Bud Selig.118 Speaking to his decisiveness in times of crisis,
Selig was once faced with the logistical conundrum of what to do in
an All-Star exhibition game when one team ran out of pitchers.119 He
decided not to have some sort of altered competition to see who won,
but to simply . . . go home; the game was declared a tie.120 That the
game was being played in Selig’s hometown of Milwaukee and that
it was supposed to be viewed as a celebration of the commissioner’s
career only added to the embarrassment.121
Some of the criticism of Commissioner Selig stems from the fact
that many see him as an owner first—of his hometown Milwaukee
Brewers—before they see him as a commissioner.122 Others feel that
Selig’s reign will be, and maybe can only be, defined by the steroid
era.123 There will always be those who feel that Selig, along with the
rest of baseball’s owners, managers, and other overseers, let the
players run roughshod over the league’s record books while abusing
drugs to accomplish their fraudulent feats.124 For some, Selig’s
Interestingly, some legendary MLB players and managers have possessed law
degrees, including likely Hall of Fame player and manager Tony La Russa, who
once said that the “best degree a baseball manager can get is a J.D. The law degree
taught me how to study, how to think, and how to implement and develop a
strategy.” Id. at 11.
118
See Bob Nightengale, Tie in ’02 All-Star Game Mattered, USA TODAY
(July
11,
2007,
4:02
AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/allstar/2007-07-10AllStartiegamefeature_N.htm.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
See Nightengale, supra note 119 (quoting Commissioner Selig’s statement:
“It was embarrassing . . . and I was tremendously saddened by it. I had looked
forward to it so long in Milwaukee, and then that happened,” and also All-Star
outfielder Torii Hunter’s statement: “I just thought it was the wrong thing to do.”).
122
See Jacob F. Lamme, The Twelve Year Rain Delay: Why a Change in
Leadership Will Benefit the Game of Baseball, 68 ALB. L. REV. 155, 180–81
(2004).
123
See Bud Selig: the Good, the Bad, & the Ugly, CBS SPORTS BLOG,
http://www.cbssports.com/mcc/blogs/entry/5814416/5852703 (last updated Feb.
28, 2008, 6:47 PM).
124
See id.
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passivity and apparent lack of leadership have defined him and, for
many, such traits have defined this era in baseball’s history.125
Any criticism of Bud Selig aside, the post of Major League
Baseball Commissioner is one of great, unilateral power. Baseball
Commissioners have historically acted most impressively through
their power to take any action that they feel is “in the best interests of
baseball.”126 In his 2012 article, Sports and the Law, the Wisconsin
Lawyer’s Joe Forward wrote:
The commissioner has the power to act “in the best
interests of baseball.” Thus, the commissioner has
authority to investigate acts, transactions, or practices
considered “not in the best interests of baseball.” Like
a judge, the commissioner can summon individuals,
order document production, and impose preventive,
remedial, or punitive sanctions deemed appropriate.
The commissioner may also adopt regulations in the
best interests of baseball.127
Ironically, and to his credit, it was Bud Selig who decided that
getting the Dodgers some new owners was in the best interests of
baseball; the Commissioner seized control of the Dodgers day-to-day
activities in 2011.128 Looking back, there is most likely no baseballSee id. See also Commish Doesn’t Want Steroids Blame, ESPN (Feb. 17,
2009, 4:49 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3912702.
Despite the advances made in testing for steroids in baseball—and despite
protestations from baseball’s leadership that the steroid era is “over”—big name
players are still being busted every few months. See Tim Elfrink, A Miami Clinic
Supplies Drugs to Sports’ Biggest Names, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Jan. 31, 2013),
http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2013-01-31/news/a-rod-and-doping-a-miamiclinic-supplies-drugs-to-sports-biggest-names/full (detailing how stars, including
one of the game’s all-time homerun leaders, Alex Rodriguez, were frequent clients
of a Miami-based steroids supplier); See also Michael S. Schmidt, Selig Says
Steroid Era is Basically Over, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/12/sports/baseball/12steroids.html
(quoting
Selig’s statement that, “[t]he use of steroids and amphetamines amongst today’s
players has greatly subsided and is virtually nonexistent, as our testing results have
shown . . . . “).
126
See Forward, supra note 9, at 7–8.
127
Id.
128
See id. at 8.
125
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appreciating person on this planet who would say that Commissioner
Selig was wrong in so acting. The Dodgers needed McCourt out, and
they needed new ownership.129 The circuitry of it all paints an
interesting picture.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

More likely than not, baseball will not face any sort of
adjustments to its financial structure or to its revenue generating and
revenue sharing mechanisms. Whether baseball needs to be saved
from itself is a debate that will be had more and more frequently in
the coming decades. Many people will look back on the sale of the
Dodgers, and Commissioner Selig’s role in it, and simply admire it
for being a decision made by a commissioner who loved baseball and
who wanted to save one of its most storied franchises from falling
into further disrepair—and they would not be crazy for feeling that
way. But some people will look back at the mad dash for television
money that followed and see something more. After all, there are
only so many elite baseball players to go around.
In the end, perhaps this is how baseball was always meant to be
played. It is the American pastime. Let other sports worry about
parity and fret over protecting the little guy. Baseball built itself out
of the ashes of the Civil War.130 The greatest franchise in the history

129

See Richard Sandomir, Old Owner of Dodgers Not a Popular Topic with
New
Owners,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
2,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/03/sports/baseball/frank-mccourt-old-owner-ofdodgers-not-a-popular-topic-with-new-owners.html (“After an increasingly
unpopular reign as Dodgers’ owner—which culminated in a particularly nasty legal
brawl over control of the team with Commissioner Bud Selig—McCourt has
become a bit like Harry Potter’s archenemy, the evil Lord Voldemort: he who must
not be named.”).
130
See Thomas v. Silvia, Baseball as a Source of Judicial Though and
Construction, 78 MICH. B.J. 1296, 1297 (1999). Silva writes:
Baseball's popularity among soldiers during the Civil War
helped stimulate interest in it among all classes of people once
they returned home. In fact, a Chicago tournament in 1867,
featuring the Washington Nationals, a team comprised of
government clerks and law students, and widely considered
America's finest team, gave A. G. Spalding his first taste of the
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of sports was built on the back of a man not much more than a
decade out of an orphanage.131 This is baseball. After all, every
single time two teams have taken the field there has been one shared
piece of knowledge between all the ballplayers out on the grass and
each and every fan sitting in the stands. They all know. Someone
has to lose.132
But these questions need to be asked, if not answered, at some
point. Baseball has the authority and the administrative infrastructure
necessary to take action and to restore some kind of economic
competitive balance to the game. Every other major American sport
has taken such a step. No other American sport faces the manic
financial future that baseball does. The rich—who are, in baseball,
obscenely rich—will get richer.
Not planning ahead in an
unregulated Wild West of financing is surely not the best way to
manage a league wherein the true competition should be taking place
on the field, not in the billion-dollar boardroom.
It is doubtful that potential efforts to prevent MLB from acting to
protect the integrity of the sport would face a legal attack strong
enough to dent the armor-plated hide of the Federal Baseball,
Toolson, and Flood cases. It ultimately becomes an issue of money.
Who is willing to risk the revenues of the biggest market teams for

national spotlight when his legendary pitching handed the
Nationals their first defeat.
Id.
Referring, of course, to George Herman “Babe” Ruth. See Robert M.
Jarvis, Babe Ruth as Legal Hero, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 885, 885 (1995).
131

Ruth appeared in 2503 games, belted 714 home runs,
collected 2873 hits, knocked in 2211 runs, drew 2056 walks, and
retired with a .342 batting average and an unparalleled .690
slugging average. Incredibly, before his powerful bat dictated
moving him from the mound to the outfield, Ruth also compiled
a 94–46 wonloss record and a 2.28 earned run average as a
pitcher.
Id. Yankee Stadium, where the Yankees played their home games from 1923 until
2008, was nicknamed “the house that Ruth built,” because of Ruth’s incomparable
influence. See Jared Tobin Finkelstein, In Re Brett: The Sticky Problem of
Statutory Construction, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 430 n.2 (1983).
132
Except at the All-Star Game.
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the sake of the small?133 Who is willing to make the long term
decisions, with the big picture interests of the sport of baseball in
mind, at the risk of potential cost in revenue for baseball’s
wealthy?134
As television revenues continue to boom, the landscape of both
college and professional sports is changing. The future might see the

133

Jeff Passan, in an article published on Yahoo! Sports after news of the
Dodger’s T.V. deal broke, lamented the inaction of the commissioner and others in
power. See Passan, supra note 16. Passan noted the perplexing behavior of
baseball’s leader:
Every chance he gets, Selig prattles on about baseball being
in a Golden Era. In some respects, he's right. The fan experience
is at its apex. The game itself never has been of higher quality.
Baseball, in a vacuum, is quite superb.
And yet the sport is not played there. It is in real life, where
Selig and the owners over whom he presides and the players who
are in their employ worship the dollar, bow to it and judge
themselves by it. Never, in that respect, has baseball found itself
so gilded.
Nor, sadly, has it found itself so vulnerable to the vagaries
set to come simply because the sport couldn't harness its own
greed.
Id.
134

At least one sportswriter has already asked whether this business model will
make sense for the Dodgers themselves. See Mark Saxon, The Price of
Contention: Long-term Concerns, ESPN L.A. (Jan. 31, 2013, 11:59 AM),
http://espn.go.com/blog/los-angeles/dodger-report/post/_/id/3681/the-price-ofcontention-long-term-concerns.
As time moves along, are the Dodgers owners going to look
to streamline their business to make it more profitable? The
principal owners, Guggenheim Partners, state on their Web site
that their “singular mission” is to “serve as superior stewards of
capital and trusted advisors to our partners and clients.” They
have more than $170 billion under their supervision.
The obligation of Mark Walter and his partners is to
maximize the wealth of their investors, not to maximize the
happiness of Dodgers fans. To keep the money flowing out of
fans’ bank accounts and into their business, the Dodgers at some
point are going to have to win . . . .
Id.
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dissolution of collegiate conferences, if not the economic survival of
only a few super conferences. In professional sports, the teams with
the flexibility and the capital to win the RSN-related battles may
upset the competitive balance of their respective sports. Do the
circumstances warrant increased regulation? They certainly warrant
consideration.
As it stands now, it does not appear that baseball is anywhere
close to thinking such measures necessary. In reality, the Dodgers’
former owner, the roundly despised Frank McCourt, was truly ousted
over concerns from MLB that he would not get enough money from a
pending television deal.135 No, for now it appears that all revenue is
good revenue at the old ballgame. Who truly will end up on top,
when another season, decade, and era’s worth of box scores have
been tallied, is anyone’s guess. The MLB standings are hard to
predict, even in this day and age.
The Forbes list, on the other hand . . . .

135

See Passan, supra note 16.

